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Abstract
This paper studies a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle model
where parents and their children are linked by bequests, both voluntary and ac-
cidental, and by the transmission of earnings ability. This model is able to match
very well the empirical observation that households with similar lifetime earnings
hold very diﬀerent amounts of wealth at retirement. Earnings heterogeneity and
borrowing constraints are essential in generating the variation in wealth at re-
tirement among low lifetime earnings households, while inheritance heterogeneity
helps to generate the heterogeneity in wealth at retirement among high lifetime
earnings households.
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11 Introduction
Many papers document that households with similar characteristics, such as lifetime
income, age, and family structure, hold very diﬀerent amounts of wealth at retirement
(see, among others, Hurst, Luoh and Staﬀord (1998), and Grafova, McGonagle and
Staﬀord (2006)). Various economists (see, for example, Bernheim, Skinner and Wein-
berg (2001), and Hendricks (2007)) argue that this feature of the data is inconsistent
with most life-cycle models of consumption-saving behavior, and thus constitutes a
challenge to such theories and their policy implications.
In particular, Venti and Wise (2000) and Hendricks (2007) document that sub-
stantial wealth diﬀerence remains after controlling for lifetime earnings and age. At
all levels of lifetime earnings, there is a large dispersion in the accumulated wealth
at retirement: A signiﬁcant fraction of high earnings households have relatively little
wealth and a substantial fraction of low earnings households have a lot.
In this paper, I quantify how much of the observed heterogeneity in wealth at
retirement can be generated by a realistically parameterized model with incomplete
markets and earnings shocks. The model that I am using mainly incorporates two
basic forces, bequests and human capital transmission, into an otherwise standard life-
cycle model.1 In this model, households face uninsurable labor-income risk, uncertain
lifetimes, and borrowing constraints in the bonds market. Households save to self-
insure against labor income shocks and life-span risk, for retirement, and possibly to
leave bequests to their children. Households are ex-ante identical. Wealth inequality
at retirement arises because households diﬀer in the timing of earnings over the life
cycle and in the amount and timing of inheritances received.2
1This model extends De Nardi (2004). It allows children to observe parents’ states and incorporates
a realistic Social Security system and a private pension system.
2I assume limited sources of heterogeneity, abstracting from ex-ante heterogeneity in wealth hold-
ings by race (see for example Smith (1995), and Altonji and Doraszelski (2005)), by education (see for
example Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), and Cagetti (2003)), and by preference (see for example
2This incomplete-market model with earnings heterogeneity and inheritance hetero-
geneity can generate large wealth heterogeneity among households with similar lifetime
earnings. I ﬁnd that while diﬀerences in the timing of earnings shocks and borrowing
constraints can generate large heterogeneity in wealth at retirement for households
at lower lifetime earnings deciles, diﬀerences in the timing and amount of inheritance
help to generate large heterogeneity in wealth at retirement for households at higher
lifetime earnings deciles.
The existence of borrowing constraints prevents households from smoothing con-
sumption intertemporally. Two households might have the same lifetime earnings, but
one might have positive earnings shocks when young and negative earnings shocks
when old while the other has negative earnings shocks when young and positive earn-
ings shocks when old. At retirement, those two households will hold amounts of wealth
that diﬀer substantially.
Inheritance adds another source of wealth heterogeneity among households with
similar lifetime earnings. Some earnings-poor households might have inherited a large
amount of assets. With a voluntary bequest motive, those who have inherited keep a
large amount of inherited assets to leave to their children, thus holding a substantial
amount of wealth at retirement. Some earnings-rich households receive no inheritance
and thus own less wealth.
The general equilibrium model with bequests and human capital transmission en-
dogenously determines an inheritance distribution. In the data, inheritances are highly
unevenly distributed. 50% of the households receive very little or no inheritance during
their life time. The top 1% of the households receive 35% of all the inheritances. The
model generates a skewed inheritance distribution that is comparable with the data.
Krusell and Smith (1998), Samwick (1998), and Hendricks (forthcoming)), from ex-post heterogeneity
in wealth holdings by marital status (see for example Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (2003), and Guner and
Knowles (2003)), by children (see for example Scholz and Seshadri (2006), and by rate of return (see
for example Guvenen (2006)).
3Modeling transmission of earnings ability across generations and bequests as luxury
goods is the key to generating a skewed distribution of inheritances.
I compare the benchmark model with models with one or no intergenerational links.
A model with bequest motives and without intergenerational transfer of productivity
generates more heterogeneity of wealth at retirement among households with similar
lifetime earnings than the benchmark model. One reason is that, voluntary bequest mo-
tives are enough to generate a skewed inheritance distribution. Another reason is that,
with an operative bequest motive, those who inherited large estates from their parents
will keep a large part of their inheritances. Thus the heterogeneity of inheritance adds
a lot to the heterogeneity of retirement wealth. The third reason is that, without
intergenerational link of productivity, inheritances are evenly distributed by lifetime
earnings decile. Some households at the low lifetime earnings deciles receive unrealisti-
cally large amount of inheritances, weakening the correlation between lifetime earnings
and retirement wealth. A version without bequest motives shows that the unequal dis-
tribution of involuntary bequests and intergenerational transfer of earnings ability are
not suﬃcient to generate the observed heterogeneity of wealth at retirement. One rea-
son is that accidental bequests along are not enough to generate a skewed inheritance
distribution. The other reason is that, without an operative bequest motive, those
who have inherited large estates from their parents will consume a large part of their
inheritances before retirement. Finally, in a model without intergenerational transfer
of both bequests and earnings ability, the only source of heterogeneity is the timing
of earnings shocks. The comparison indicates that the timing of earnings shocks and
the existence of borrowing constraints along are not enough to generate the observed
wealth heterogeneity among households with similar lifetime earnings.
This paper is related to the literature that examines the implications of diﬀerent
models on wealth dispersions at retirement age. Engen, Gale, Carroll and Laibson
4(1999), Engen, Gale and Uccello (2004), and Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2006)
study the adequacy of household retirement saving. Those papers abstract from the
intergenerational links of bequests and earnings ability. Gokhale, Kotlikoﬀ, Sefton and
Weale (2001) abstract from voluntary bequest motives. Hendricks (2007) ﬁnds that
while the qualitative implications of a model with earnings and inheritance diﬀerences
are in line with the data, the quantitative implications are not. The key diﬀerence
between my model and Hendricks’s is in the treatment of bequests. Hendricks assumes
all bequests are accidental; I assume households are altruistic towards their descen-
dants. Hendricks assumes that households receive bequests at the same age; I assume
that the time of inheritance is uncertain and diﬀerent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some empirical results from
Venti and Wise (2000) and Hendricks (2007) documenting heterogeneity of wealth at
retirement among households with similar lifetime earnings. In Section 3, I present the
model and the calibration of the model. In Section 4, I show the quantitative results
of the benchmark model and investigate the importance of earnings heterogeneity
and inheritance heterogeneity. Section 5 investigates the quantitative importance of
intergenerational links. Section 6 presents conclusions.
2 Empirical Findings
This section presents some empirical results from Venti and Wise (2000) and Hendricks
(2007) showing that, substantial wealth diﬀerence remains after controlling for lifetime
earnings and age: Households with similar lifetime earnings hold diverse amounts of
wealth at retirement age.
Venti and Wise (2000) use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
for households whose heads were between age 51 to 61 in 1992. They use wealth of
the household and lifetime earnings measured by historical earnings reported to Social
5Security Administration. They ﬁnd that, at all levels of lifetime earnings, there is a
large dispersion in the accumulated wealth at retirement. Very little of this dispersion
can be explained by diﬀerences in individual circumstances that are out of the control
of the households. They argue, informally, that the dispersion of wealth at retirement
must be attributed to diﬀerences in the amount that households choose to save.
Hendricks (2007) uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
on wealth reported at age 65.3 Earnings consist of labor income (net of income tax
payments and Social Security contributions) received by the household head and by the
spouse, which include wages, salaries, bonuses, overtime payments, and the business
part of labor income. Lifetime earnings are the presented value of earnings between
the ages of 18 and 65, discounted to age 65.
Log lifetime income 
Figure 1: Retirement wealth and lifetime earnings in the PSID
Figure 1 shows the scattered plot of log retirement wealth and log lifetime earn-
ings from PSID. Wealth at retirement is strongly correlated with lifetime earnings:
The correlation coeﬃcient between lifetime earnings and wealth at retirement is 0.61.
However, at all levels of lifetime earnings there is large dispersion in the accumulated
3SCF has a better coverage of high-earner and high-wealth households than PSID and HRS. How-
ever, as is shown in Juster, Smith and Staﬀord (1999), and Cagetti (2003), for lower quartiles, those
data sets give similar information.
6wealth at retirement: A signiﬁcant fraction of high earnings households have relatively
little wealth and a signiﬁcant fraction of low earnings households have a lot.














Figure 2: Gini coeﬃcient of retirement wealth for each earnings decile
Figure 2 displays the Gini coeﬃcient of retirement wealth for each lifetime earnings
decile from Venti and Wise (2000) and Hendricks (2007). We observe that, controlling
for age and lifetime earnings reduces wealth inequality. For example, in the PSID,
the average of the Gini coeﬃcients in wealth across lifetime earnings deciles is 0.54,
compared with 0.62 in the full sample. However, there is still large wealth inequality
after controlling for age and lifetime earnings: The Gini coeﬃcients are all above 0.4.
The degree of wealth inequality declines with lifetime earnings decile.
To check the robustness of those ﬁndings, Venti and Wise (2000) conduct regres-
sions to control for household characteristics. Hendricks (2007) restricts samples to
contain only households with similar characteristics. The main ﬁndings are not af-
fected by household characteristics such as numbers of children, marital breakups,
self-employment, or stock holdings.
Those papers’ ﬁndings thus indicate that households with similar lifetime earnings
hold diverse amounts of wealth at retirement age, even when samples are restricted
to exclude sources of wealth heterogeneity that are not related to earnings. Those
features of the data constitute a challenge to our theories of saving behavior.
73 The Model
The economy is a discrete-time overlapping generations world with an inﬁnitely-lived
government. There are idiosyncratic earnings shocks. These shocks are uninsurable:
The only ﬁnancial instrument is a one-period bond. Households cannot engage in
unsecured borrowing; net assets must be non-negative. There is mortality risk but
private annuity markets do not exist.4 Members of successive generations are linked
by bequests and the children’s inheritance of part of their parent’s productivity. At
age 20, each agent enters the model and starts consuming, working, and paying labor
and capital income taxes. At age 35, the agent procreates. After retirement, the
agent no longer works but receives interest from accumulated assets and beneﬁts from
deﬁned beneﬁt plan and Social Security. The government taxes labor earnings, capital
income and estates, pays Social Security beneﬁts to retirees, and provides government
consumption.
3.1 Demographics
During each model period, which is 5 years long, a continuum of people is born. Since
there are no inter-vivos transfers, all agents start their working life with no assets.5 I
denote age t = 1 as 20 years old, age t = 2 as 25 years old, and so on. At the beginning
of period 4, the agent’s children are born, and four periods later (when the agent is
55 years old) the children are 20 years old and start working. The agents retire at
t = 10 (when they are 65 years old) and die by the end of age T = 14 (before turning
90 years old). From t = 10 (when they are 65 years old), each person faces a positive
probability of dying, given by (1 − pt). The probability of dying is exogenous and
4Although private annuity market do exist in the U.S., due to reasons such as the lack of actuarially
fair price, and the existence of bequest motives, the demand for annuity is quite low.
5Data from the HRS suggests that observed inter-vivos monetary transfers are fairly small (Cardia
and Ng (2000)). Given the small size of observed inter-vivos monetary transfers, I doubt that this
simpliﬁcation would aﬀect much the quantitative predictions of my model.
8independent of other household characteristics. The population grows at rate n. Since
the demographic patterns are stable, agents at age t make up a constant fraction of the
population at any point in time. Figure 3 illustrates the demographics in the model.
Generation  t-7 (Parents) 
         55  60   65   70   75   80   85   90 
Generation  t
                         20    25   30  35    40   45   50   55   60   65   70   75   80    85   90 
   procreate              retire      death shock 
              Generation  t+7  (Children)
               20   25    30   35   40   45    50   55
Figure 3: Demographics
3.2 Government
The government taxes labor earnings, capital income and estates to ﬁnance the ex-
ogenous public expenditure, G, and to provide Social Security beneﬁts to the retired
agents. Income from labor is taxed at a ﬂat rate τl.6 Income from capital is taxed at
a ﬂat rate τa. Government taxes bequests at the rate τb for the proportion above the
exemption level exb.
The structure of the Social Security system is the following: Retired households
receive Social Security beneﬁts from the government each period until they die. The
Social Security beneﬁts that individuals receive are linked to their average lifetime
earnings according to a piecewise linear function.
3.3 Technology
There is one type of good produced according to the aggregate production function
F(K;L) = KαL1−α, where K is the aggregate capital stock and L is the aggregate
labor input. The ﬁnal goods can be either consumed or invested into physical capital.
6In the model, labor earnings are estimated using after-tax earnings. Thus all the progressive
features of the tax system are already reﬂected in the calibrated after-tax earnings distribution. I
introduce a constant tax rate τl to balance the government budget.
9Physical capital depreciates at rate δ. Households rent capital and eﬃcient labor units
to the representative ﬁrm each period, and receive rental income at the interest rate r
and wage income at the wage rate w.
The representative ﬁrm maintains a deﬁned beneﬁt plan, which is ﬁnanced by
contributions on each work’s behalf. All workers face the same contribution rate τDB.
Retired households receive pensions from deﬁned beneﬁt plan each period until they
die. The pension beneﬁts that individuals receive are linked to their average lifetime
earnings according to a piecewise linear function.7
3.4 Consumer’s Maximization Problem
3.4.1 Preferences
Individuals derive utility from consumption and from bequests transferred to their
children upon death.8 Preferences are assumed to be time separable, with a constant
discount factor β. The momentary utility function from consumption is of the constant





Following De Nardi (2004), the utility from bequest b is denoted by
(2) φ(b) = φ1(1 + b/φ2)
1−η.
The term φ1 reﬂects the parent’s concern about leaving bequests to his/her children,
while φ2 measures the extent to which bequests are luxury goods.9
7Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2006) propose an alternative model of deﬁned beneﬁt plan, in
which pension beneﬁts are linked to individuals’ average earnings in the past 5 year before retirement.
8Note that this form of ‘impure’ bequest motive implies that an individual cares about the total
bequests left to his/her children, but not about consumption of his/her children.
9With the speciﬁcations, bequests are luxury goods. The scalar 1 inside the parameters ensures
that the marginal utility of small bequests is bounded, while the marginal utility of large bequests
declines more slowly than the marginal utility of consumption.
103.4.2 Labor Productivity
In this economy, all agents of the same birth cohort face the same exogenous age-
eﬃciency proﬁle, ￿t. Each worker i also faces stochastic productivity shocks yi
t, which
follows a Markov process
lny
i









This Markov process, Qy, is the same for all households, so that there is no uncertainty
over the aggregate labor endowment. The total productivity of a worker at age t is
given by the product of the worker’s age-t productivity shock and age-t deterministic
eﬃciency index: yi
t￿t.
To capture the intergenerational correlation of earnings, I assume the parent’s pro-













What the children inherit is only their ﬁrst draw; from age 20 on, their productivity
yt evolves stochastically according to Qy.
3.4.3 The Household’s Recursive Problem
In a stationary equilibrium, the interest rate is constant at r and the wage rate is at w.10
I assume that children have full information about their parents’ state and children
solve their decision problems after observing their parents’ decisions. Children infer the
size of the bequests they are likely to receive based on this information. The household’s
state variables are given by (t,a,y, e y,Sp). The ﬁrst four variables denote the agent’s
age, ﬁnancial assets carried from the previous period, the agent’s productivity, and
cumulated average productivity, respectively. The last term Sp denotes the agent’s
10A formal deﬁnition of the stationary equilibrium is provided in Appendix 7.1.
11parent’s state variables and diﬀers in each of the following four cases.
(i) From t = 1 to t = 2 (from 20 to 25 years of age), the agent survives for sure
until next period and does not expect to receive a bequest because his/her parent is
younger than 65.
(3) V (t,a,y, e y,ap,yp, e yp) = max










0 = (1 − τl)w￿y + (1 + r(1 − τa))a (4)
a
0 ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, (5)
e y0 = ((t − 1)e y + ￿y)/t, (6)
e y0
p = ((t + 6)e yp + ￿yp)/(t + 7). (7)
At any subperiod, the agent’s resources depend on asset holdings, a, and labor
endowment, ￿y. Asset holdings pay a risk-free rate r and labor receives a real wage w.
Average productivity for children and parents accumulates according to equations (6)
and (7), respectively.
(ii) From t = 3 to t = 7 (from 30 to 50 years of age), the worker survives for sure
until the next period. However, the agent’s parent is at least 65 years old and faces a
positive probability of dying at any period; hence, a bequest might be received at the
beginning of the next period. Let V I(t,a,y, e y) and V (t,a,y,e y,ap, e yp) denote the value
function of a person whose parent is dead and alive, respectively. In the former case,
ap and e yp are not in the state space any more.
(8) V
I(t,a,y, e y) = max




subject to (4), (5), and (6).
12(9)









subject to (5), (6), and
c + a
+ = (1 − τl)w￿y + (1 + r(1 − τa))a (10)
a
0 = a
+ + b, (11)
where a+ denotes the ﬁnancial assets at the end of the period before receiving be-
quests.11
(iii) The sub periods t = 8 to t = 9 (from 55 to 60 years of age) are the periods
before retirement, during which no more inheritances are expected because the agent’s
parent is already dead by that time. The agent does not face any survival uncertainty.
(12) V (t,a,y, e y) = max
c,a0 U(c) + βE(V (t + 1,a
0,y
0, e y0))
subject to (4), (5), and (6).
(iv) From t = 10 to t = 14 (from 65 to 85 years of age), the agent does not work
and does not inherit any more, but faces a positive probability of dying. In case of
death, the agent derives utility from bequeathing his/her assets. Households receive
Social Security beneﬁts P(e y) and pensions from deﬁned beneﬁt plan DB(e y).
(13) V (t,a,e y) = max
c,a0 U(c) + βpt(V (t + 1,a
0, e y)) + (1 − pt)φ(b)
subject to (5) and
c + a
0 = (1 + r(1 − τa))a + P(e y) + DB(e y)
b = a
0 − τb ∗ max(a
0 − exb,0).
11Since parents are retired, average productivity for parents, e yp, does not change over time.
133.5 Calibration
The model has twenty-one parameters. I pick seventeen of them from other empiri-
cal studies and choose the remaining four parameters so that the model matches the
bequest-capital ratio, the ratio of wealth to after-tax earnings, the average bequest left
by people in the lowest 80th bequest percentile, and government spending.12
I set the rate of population growth, n, to the average value of population growth
from 1950 to 1997 from the Council of Economic Advisors (1998). The pt’s are the
vectors of conditional survival probabilities for people older than 65 and is set to the
mortality probabilities for people born in 1965 (Bell, Wade and Goss (1992)).
The deterministic age-proﬁle of labor productivity ￿t is taken from Hansen (1993).13
The persistence ρy and variance σ2
y of the stochastic productivity process are estimated
from PSID data (Altonji and Villanueva (2002)).14 The persistence is low and variance
is high because this refers to income in a 5-year period. I take persistence ρyh of the
productivity inheritance process from Zimmerman (1992), and variance σ2
yh from De
Nardi (2004).
The capital income tax τa is set to be 20% (Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters and Walliser (1999)).
The rate τb is the tax rate on estates that exceed the exemption level exb. I choose
these two parameters from De Nardi (2004) who matches the observed ratio of estate
tax revenues to GDP, and the proportion of estates that pay estate taxes. G is total
government expenditure and gross investment excluding transfers, and is chosen to be
18% of GDP (Council of Economic Advisors (1998) for 1996).
The Social Security beneﬁt is calculated to mimic the Old Age and Survivor In-
surance component of Social Security system. The Social Security beneﬁt is equal
12One period in this model corresponds to 5 years in real life, thus I adjust parameters accordingly.
13Since I impose mandatory retirement at the age of 65, I set ￿t = 0 for t > 9.
14De Nardi (2004) provides a detailed discussion of the estimation process.
14Parameters Calibrations
Demographics
n annual population growth 1.2%
pt survival probability see text
Endowment
￿t age-eﬃciency proﬁle see text
ρy AR(1) coeﬃcient of 5-year productivity process 0.85
σ2
y innovation of 5-year productivity process 0.30
ρyh AR(1) coeﬃcient of productivity inheritance process 0.67
σ2
yh innovation of productivity inheritance process 0.37
Government policy
τa tax on capital income 20%
τb tax on bequest 10%
exb exemption level on bequest tax 40
G government spending 0.18
P(e y) Social Security income see text
τl tax on labor income 33%
Technology
α capital share in National Income 0.36
δ annual depreciation rate of capital 0.06
DB(e y) Pension from deﬁned beneﬁt plan see text
τDB Contribution rate to deﬁned beneﬁt plan 6.2%
Preference
η risk aversion coeﬃcient 1.5
β discount factor 0.96
φ1 weight of bequest in utility function −14
φ2 shifter of bequest in utility function 12
Table 1: Parameters used in the benchmark model
to 
    
    
0.9e yw e yw ≤ 0.2
0.18 + 0.32(e yw − 0.2) 0.2 ≤ e yw < 1.24
0.5128 + 0.15(e yw − 1.24) 1.24 ≤ e yw

    
    
.
The bend points, expressed as average earnings, and marginal rates are from Huggett
and Ventura (2000).15
I take α, the share of income that goes to capital, to be 0.36 (Prescott (1986),
15The corresponding payroll tax rate that balances the Social Security funds budget is 10.3%. Since
the model focuses on retirement beneﬁts, this rate should be compared with payroll taxes excluding
the Medicare and Disability Insurance (10.6%).
15and Cooley and Prescott (1995)). I take depreciation to be 6% (Stokey and Rebelo
(1995)). Given the calibration for the production function, the before-tax interest rate
on capital net of depreciation r, is 6%. The deﬁned beneﬁt is equal to

                    
                    
0 e yw < 0.56
0.5(e yw − 0.56) 0.56 ≤ e yw < 0.95
0.1950 + 0.4(e yw − 0.95) 0.95 ≤ e yw < 1.24
0.3110 + 0.23(e yw − 1.24) 1.24 ≤ e yw < 2.74
0.5939 + 0.05(e yw − 3.0) 2.74 ≤ e yw < 3.0
0.6204 + 0.02(e yw − 3.8) 3.0 ≤ e yw < 3.8
0.6364 + 0.02(e yw − 3.8) 3.8 ≤ e yw < 4.0
0.6386 + 0.01(e yw − 4.0) e yw ≥ 4.0

                    
                    
.
The bend points, expressed as average earnings, and marginal rates are chosen to
mimic the holding of deﬁned beneﬁts wealth by lifetime earnings from HRS (Scholz,
Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2006)). The ﬂat contribution rate τDB that balances the
ﬁrm’s budget is 6.2%.
I take the risk aversion coeﬃcient, η, to be 1.5, from Attanasio, Banks, Meghir and
Weber (1999), and Gourinchas and Parker (2002), who estimate it from consumption
data. This value is in the commonly used range (1-5) in the literature.
I choose β,φ1,φ2, and τl to match the ratio of wealth to after-tax earnings of
4.9 (Hendricks (2007)), bequest-capital ratio of 0.88% (Gale and Scholz (1994)), the
average bequest left at the lowest 80th percentile of 2.78 (Hurd and Smith (2001)),
and to balance government budget.16
16I use distribution for single decedents instead of the one for all decedents. Typically a surviving
spouse inherits a large share of the estate, consumes part of it, and only leaves the remaining to the
couple’s children.
164 Numerical Results
This section examines to what extent the quantitative life-cycle model, with incomplete-
markets, earnings heterogeneity, and inheritances heterogeneity, can account for the
relationship between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings and the observed large
wealth diﬀerence among households with similar lifetime earnings. To answer this
question, I ﬁrst solve for the equilibrium. Details about computation are provided in
Appendix 7.2. I then simulate 200,000 households starting from age 20 drawn from the
initial distribution. I deﬁne retirement wealth to be the wealth at age 65, and lifetime
earnings to be the total earnings from age 20 to 60, discounted to age 65 using the
after-tax interest rate. I will compare results from the model with those from the PSID
reported in Hendricks (2007).17 Then I decompose the eﬀect of earnings heterogeneity
and inheritance heterogeneity on wealth at retirement.
4.1 Wealth Inequality and Lifetime Earnings
I ﬁrst look at the relationship between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings. Figure
4 shows a scattered plot of log retirement wealth and log lifetime earnings generated by
the model, where I normalize values using 1994 dollars.18 The model implies a positive
correlation of retirement wealth with lifetime earnings and a large dispersion in accu-
mulated retirement wealth at all levels of lifetime earnings. In the benchmark model,
as in the data shown in Figure 1, a substantial fraction of high earnings households
have relatively little wealth and a signiﬁcant fraction of low earnings households have
a lot.
Figure 5 compares the Gini coeﬃcients for retirement wealth for each lifetime earn-
ings decile in the benchmark economy and in the PSID. We notice two important
17Appendices 7.4 and 7.3 show the wealth distribution for the whole economy and for households
at retirement age, and the distribution of lifetime earnings.
18For explanatory purpose, I randomly pick 1500 households from the simulated sample.


































Figure 4: Retirement wealth and lifetime earnings (benchmark model)
features. First, we observe that, after controlling for age and lifetime earnings, there is
still large wealth inequality in the model: The Gini coeﬃcients in all earnings deciles
in the benchmark economy are all above 0.3. Second, the degree of wealth inequality
declines as lifetime earnings increases, as is observed in the data. For example, in the
model the Gini coeﬃcient is 0.66 for the 1st earnings decile and is 0.49 for the 5th
decile. The model economy matches the wealth inequality for the lower deciles quite
well but underestimates wealth inequality for the highest two deciles a bit.

















Figure 5: Gini coeﬃcient of retirement wealth for each lifetime earnings decile (benchmark)
To measure how large are the wealth diﬀerences between earnings-rich and earnings-
18poor households, I show in Figure 6, the mean retirement wealth at each lifetime
earnings decile, normalized by average household after-tax earnings. In the PSID, the
earnings-rich households on average hold more wealth than the earnings-poor house-
holds. The model does a very good job in matching the mean retirement wealth
observed in the data for each earnings decile. In this model, households with higher
lifetime earnings will save more than households with lower lifetime earnings due to
the facts that bequest is a luxury good and beneﬁts from Social Security and from
deﬁned beneﬁt plan follow a concave function of lifetime earnings.


































































Figure 6: Mean of retirement wealth for each earnings decile (benchmark model)
To better gauge the amount of wealth dispersion at retirement generated by the
model, Figures 7 compares the retirement wealth distributions for the 2nd, 5th, and 9th
lifetime earnings deciles in the model with those in the data, where wealth is normalized
by average household after-tax earnings. The model successfully replicates the fact
that households with similar lifetime earnings hold diverse amounts of wealth. At each
lifetime earnings decile, households in the lower wealth deciles hold very little wealth
while households in the higher wealth deciles hold much more wealth. For example,
a large fraction of households in the 2nd earnings decile hold almost no wealth. The
model generates skewed wealth distribution comparable to the data for the 2nd and
195th lifetime earnings deciles. Among households in the 9th lifetime earnings decile in
the model, most people but the richest hold more wealth than in the data.




































(a) 2nd lifetime earnings decile.




































(b) 5th lifetime earnings decile.





































(c) 9th lifetime earnings decile.
Figure 7: Distribution of wealth (benchmark model)
Table 2 compares some statistics summarizing the relationship between retirement
wealth and lifetime earnings in the PSID with those in the benchmark economy. The
model with earnings heterogeneity and inheritance heterogeneity can generate large
wealth heterogeneity among households with similar lifetime earnings. The correlation
between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings (0.78) is positive. It is slightly higher
20than that in the data (0.61). After controlling for age and lifetime earnings, the average
of Gini coeﬃcients of retirement wealth within lifetime earnings deciles (0.47) is still
quite high.
Corr(W, E) Mean Gini Gini
PSID 0.61 0.54 0.62
Benchmark 0.78 0.47 0.62
Adding measurement error 0.77 0.47 0.62
Table 2: Relationship between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings
Both earnings and wealth in the data may subject to measurement error. The
fact that Venti and Wise (2000) and Hendricks (2007) obtain similar results based on
alternative data sources suggests that measurement error does not aﬀect the empirical
results much. To further address the issue of measurement error, I add random noise
into the sample simulated from the model. I assume that for each household, the
measured lifetime earnings is the product of the simulated lifetime earnings in the
model multiplied by a random variable which is normally distributed with mean 1 and
standard deviation 0.1. Similarly, random noise is added to the measured wealth at
retirement. The random variable added to lifetime earnings is uncorrelated with the
one added to wealth. The results are show in Table 2. Adding random noise weakens
the correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth slightly. However, the
average Gini coeﬃcient barely changes. The reason is that, by grouping households
into deciles, rather than looking at each household, some random noise averages out.
Compared with Hendricks (2007), the benchmark economy generates much larger
heterogeneity in retirement wealth holding among households with similar lifetime
earnings. In his model, there is a high correlation between retirement wealth and life-
time earnings (0.82) and a low average Gini coeﬃcient (0.39). There are two important
21reasons for the diﬀerences in ﬁndings. First, in Hendricks (2007), households receive
inheritance at the same age and the distribution of inheritance is approximated on a
5 point grid. As a consequence, inheritance heterogeneity is limited. Second, without
voluntary bequest motives, those households who have inherited large amount con-
sume a large part of the inheritance before retirement, reducing the wealth diﬀerences
at retirement due to inheritance. In my model, households receive diﬀerent amount
of inheritances at diﬀerent time and hold on more wealth due to operative bequest
motives, which generates more heterogeneity in retirement wealth among households
with similar lifetime earnings.
4.2 The Eﬀect of Earnings Heterogeneity
In the benchmark model, parents and children are linked by voluntary bequests and
human capital transmission. Retirement wealth inequality arises because households
diﬀer in the timing of earnings over the life cycle and in the amount and timing of
inheritance received. Let us now try to understand the eﬀect of earnings heterogene-
ity on the heterogeneity in retirement wealth among household with similar lifetime
earnings.
A simple life-cycle model without earnings uncertainty and without borrowing con-
straints predicts a perfect correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth.
Adding earnings uncertainty and borrowing constraints breaks the prefect correlation,
since the timing of positive or negative shocks diﬀers among household with identical
lifetime earnings.
Suppose two households have the same lifetime earnings, but one has positive earn-
ings shocks when young and negative earnings shocks when old, the other has the
reverse. The household with positive earnings shocks when young would save more in
the earlier ages to buﬀer against negative earnings shocks later. Then he/she suﬀers
22negative earnings shocks later, he/she uses assets to ﬁnance consumption, resulting in
low level of retirement wealth.
The household with negative earnings shocks when young anticipates high earnings
in the future and would like to borrow to ﬁnance consumption but cannot. When
he/she gets positive earnings shocks later, he/she saves most of them for retirement,
and ends up holding a relatively large amount of wealth at retirement.
Age
20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 60-65 65
1 Shocks 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 5 5
Earnings 15 19 21 23 24 51 103 479 448
Assets 0 0 0 0 1 3 13 47 270 508
2 Shocks 3 3 3 2 2 1 0 0 1
Earnings 62 79 91 49 51 24 11 10 22
Assets 0 7 21 40 40 40 34 25 13 3
3 Shocks 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5
Earnings 62 79 91 99 494 495 490 479 448
Assets 0 7 21 40 65 270 508 697 955 1118
4 Shock 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 0
Earnings 297 165 191 207 215 104 103 49 10
Assets 0 105 144 197 270 317 317 317 270 168
Table 3: Simulation of earnings and assets (in $1000)
Table 3, row 1 and 2, show the simulated shocks, 5-year earnings, and assets holding
at the beginning of each period for two households in the 3rd earnings decile with the
same discounted lifetime earnings of 1,850,000. Their parents have the same assets
at each age so their expectations of bequests are the same. Neither of them receives
any bequests. But because of the diﬀerent timing of earnings, the 1st household has
retirement assets of $508,000, 169 times as big as the 2nd household has ($3,000).
Table 3, row 3 and 4, show the simulated paths for two households in the 8th
earnings decile with the same discounted lifetime earnings of 6,200,000. The 3rd
household has retirement assets 7 times as big as the 4th household has. Households
with negative earnings shocks when young and positive earnings shocks later, hold a
23relatively large amount of wealth at retirement, than households with positive earnings
shocks when young and negative earnings shocks later. This holds for all earnings
deciles. But the relative diﬀerence in wealth holdings is smaller among higher earnings
households (row 3 vs row 4) than lower earnings households (row 1 vs row 2).
This comparison indicates that earnings heterogeneity caused by the diﬀerent tim-
ing of earnings plays a more important role in generating heterogeneity on retirement
wealth among households in the lower earnings deciles. The main reason is that bene-
ﬁts from Social Security and deﬁned beneﬁt plan follow a concave function of lifetime
earnings. Households in all earnings deciles use assets to ﬁnance consumption when
suﬀer negative earnings shocks later in life. Households in the lower earnings deciles,
use more assets to ﬁnance consumption and carry fewer assets into retirement, since
they anticipate higher pension wealth relative to current assets. On the contrary,
households in the higher earnings deciles, use less assets to ﬁnance consumption and
carry more assets into retirement, since they anticipate lower pension wealth relative
to current assets.
4.3 The Eﬀect of Inheritance Heterogeneity
Now I show the eﬀect of inheritance heterogeneity on retirement wealth. The general
equilibrium model with intergenerational links of bequests and human capital trans-
mission endogenously determine an inheritance distribution. Table 4 reports values for
the inheritance distribution implied by the benchmark economy and in the PSID (Hen-
dricks (2007)). All inheritances received are deﬂated and discounted to the year where
the head is 50 years old. In the PSID, inheritances are highly unevenly distributed
with a Gini coeﬃcient of 0.89. The top 1% of the households receive 35% of all the
inheritances and the top 1-5% of the households receive 31% of all the inheritances.
50% of the households receive very little or no inheritance during their life time. The
24model generates a skewed inheritance distribution that is comparable with the data.
50% of the households receive no inheritance during their life time. The top 1% of the
households receive 19% of the total inheritance, and the top 1-5% of the households
receive 35% of the total inheritance.
Top percentile (%)
1 1-5 5-10 10-20 20-30 30-50 50-100 Gini
PSID 35 31 14 13 5 2 0 0.89
Benchmark 19 35 20 17 6 2 0 0.86
Table 4: Lorenz curve of inheritance distribution
Modeling the transmission of earnings ability across generations and treating be-
quests as luxury goods are essential to match the observed skewness in the inheritance
distribution. First, because the marginal utility from bequeathing is ﬁnite at zero be-
quests, wealth-poor households ﬁnd that the marginal utility of consumption always
exceeds the marginal utility of bequest. These households will choose not to leave any
bequest at the last stage of their life cycle. This helps to generate a large fraction of
households without any inheritance. Secondly, some large inheritances are transmitted
across generations because of the voluntary bequests. Because the marginal utility of
bequests declines more slowly than the marginal utility of consumption, the richest
households have strong bequest motives to save some assets for their children even
when very old. When there is a positive correlation between parents and children,
their oﬀspring are more likely to be earnings-rich and thus tend to leave more wealth
to their oﬀspring, thus generating a skewed inheritance distribution.
To see how the inheritances are distributed by lifetime earnings, I present in Table 5,
fraction of lifetime inheritances (in percentage) received by households in each lifetime
earnings decile. In the PSID (Hendricks (2001)), inheritance is unevenly distributed
across lifetime earnings deciles. Earnings-richer households receive larger inheritances.
25Households in the top 2 lifetime earnings deciles receive 41% of the total inheritance.
The model generates an increasing relation between inheritance and lifetime earnings.
Modeling the transmission of earnings ability across generations and a highly correlated
earnings process along the lifetime is key in generating this pattern.19
1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10
PSID 14 6 22 17 41
Benchmark 7 11 17 24 40
Table 5: Fraction of inheritances received by lifetime earnings decile (%)
Now I compare wealth distributions of 65-year-old households, in the 2nd, 5th and
9th lifetime earnings deciles, that did and did not inherit. This comparison can shed
light on what role the inheritance heterogeneity plays in generating the heterogeneity of
retirement wealth. The results are shown in Figure 8. At each decile, those who never
inherited hold less wealth that those who have inherited, and the diﬀerence increases
as wealth decile increases. The reason is, with operative bequest motives, those who
have inherited hold a large part of the inheritances upon retirement age.
We also notice that inheritance heterogeneity plays a more important role for the
higher earnings deciles: The diﬀerence between two distributions of retirement wealth
increases by lifetime earnings decile. For example, those two distributions of retirement
wealth for the 2nd earnings decile diﬀer after the 30th percentile, while those two distri-
butions of retirement wealth for the 9th earnings decile diﬀer since the 10th percentile.
One reasons is that, as is shown in Table 5, there is a positive correlation between
lifetime inheritance and lifetime earnings: Those who have high lifetime earnings are
more likely to inherit large estates. The other reason is that, since bequest is modeled
19The monotonicity relation is weaker in the data. This might due to the fact that, in reality each
married individual might receive up to 4 inheritances from his/her own parents and from the parents
of the spouse. Parental wealth is imperfectly correlated since the degree of assortative matching
between spouses is not strong.














































9th earning decile (inherited)
9th earning decile (never inherited)
5th earning decile (inherited)
5th earning decile (never inherited)
2nd earning decile (inherited)
2nd earning decile (never inherited)
Figure 8: Distribution of wealth (benchmark model)
as a luxury good, households in the high lifetime earnings deciles, holding relatively
more wealth, tend to leave more wealth to their oﬀspring by carrying relatively more
wealth towards retirement. Households in the low lifetime earnings deciles, holding
relatively less wealth and thus less willing to leave bequests, consume more fraction of
inheritance before retirement.
5 Decomposition
To understand the quantitative importance of intergenerational links of bequests and
earnings ability, I run several experiments. First, I look at the model where parents
care about leaving bequests to their children but there is no intergenerational transfer
of productivity. Then, I look at a model where parents do not care about bequests
but there is intergenerational transfer of bequest. Finally, to see how much wealth
inequality can be generated by the life-cycle structure when only earnings uncertainty
is activated, I turn oﬀ all intergenerational links and assume accidental bequests are
equally redistributed among 50-year-old people.20 In each case, I recalibrate β accord-
20This is an extended version of Huggett (1996). It incorporates a realistic Social Security system
and a private pension system.
27ingly to target the same wealth-earnings ratio.
5.1 No Productivity Transfers
I now look at the model where parents care about leaving bequests to their children but
there is no intergenerational transfer of productivity. Table 6, row three shows that
in this case the correlation between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings is 0.74,
compared with 0.78 in the benchmark economy. The Gini coeﬃcient of retirement
wealth is 0.60, compared with 0.62 in the benchmark. The average Gini coeﬃcient of
retirement wealth within lifetime earning deciles is 0.50, compared with 0.47 in the
benchmark.
Corr(W, E) Mean Gini Gini
PSID 0.61 0.54 0.62
Benchmark 0.78 0.47 0.62
Decomposition
No productivity transfers 0.74 0.50 0.60
No bequest motives 0.83 0.40 0.57
No links 0.85 0.33 0.54
Table 6: Relationship between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings
Compared with the benchmark model, the model with bequest motives and without
intergenerational transfer of productivity generates more heterogeneity of retirement
wealth. The ﬁrst reason is that, even without intergenerational transfer of productivity,
voluntary bequest motives are enough to generate a skewed inheritance distribution
(Table 7, row two). The total bequest left (B/K) is quite similar to the benchmark
economy. The amount of heterogeneity in inheritances is only slightly smaller. The
Gini coeﬃcient of inheritance is 0.85, compared with 0.86 in the benchmark economy.
28The second reason is that, with an operative bequest motive, those who inherited large
estates from their parents will consume only a small part of their inheritances by the
age of 65. Thus the heterogeneity of inheritance adds a lot to the heterogeneity of
retirement wealth. The third reason is that, without intergenerational link of produc-
tivity, inheritances are evenly distributed by lifetime earnings decile, which is against
what is observed in the data reported in Table 5. Some households at the low life-
time earnings deciles receive unrealistically large amount of inheritances, weakening
the correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth.
Top percentile (%)
1 1-5 5-10 10-20 20-30 30-50 Gini B/K(%)
Benchmark 20 35 20 17 6 2 0.86 0.88
No Prod. Trans. 19 35 20 17 6 3 0.85 0.83
No Beq. Motive 18 32 19 19 8 4 0.83 0.56
Table 7: Lorenz curve of inheritance distribution
5.2 No Bequest Motives
I now look at the model where parents do not care about leaving bequests to their
children but there is intergenerational transfer of productivity. Accidental bequests, if
any, are inherited by the children of the deceased. Table 6, row four reports the relevant
statistics. In this case, the correlation between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings
is higher than in the benchmark. Control for age and lifetime earnings reduces a larger
part of the observed wealth inequality: The average Gini coeﬃcient of retirement
wealth within lifetime earnings deciles is 0.40, compared with 0.47 in the benchmark.
This comparison shows that the unequal distribution of involuntary bequests and
intergenerational transfer of earnings ability are not suﬃcient to generate the observed
29heterogeneity of retirement wealth. One reason is that accidental bequests are not
enough to generate skewed inheritance distribution (Table 7, row three). Without
voluntary bequest motives, the total bequest left (B/K) is much smaller. The amount
of heterogeneity in inheritances is also smaller. The Gini coeﬃcient of inheritance is
0.83, compared with 0.86 in the benchmark economy. The other reason is that, without
an operative bequest motive, those who have inherited large estates from their parents
will consume a large part of their inheritances before retirement.
5.3 No Intergenerational Links
Table 6, row ﬁve shows statistics summarizing the relationship between retirement
wealth and lifetime earnings in the model without intergenerational links. The corre-
lation between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings (0.85) is much stronger than
in the benchmark economy. The average Gini coeﬃcient of retirement wealth within
lifetime earnings deciles is 0.33, compared with 0.47 in benchmark. In the model with-
out intergenerational transfer of bequests and earnings ability, accidental bequests are
equally redistributed, thus the only source of heterogeneity is the timing of earnings
shocks. The comparison indicates that the timing of earnings shocks and the existence
of borrowing constraints in the bonds market along are not enough to generate the
observed large wealth heterogeneity among households with similar lifetime earnings.
6 Conclusions
Empirical studies using micro data ﬁnd that there is large heterogeneity in retirement
wealth among households with similar lifetime earnings, and raise doubts about the
ability of a standard life-cycle model of saving behavior to reproduce the observed
facts.
30I use a quantitative, incomplete-markets, life-cycle, general equilibrium model in
which parents and their children are linked by voluntary bequests and by the trans-
mission of earnings ability. I show that the model with earnings heterogeneity and
inheritance heterogeneity generates an amount of heterogeneity in retirement wealth
comparable to that in the data. This suggests that a properly speciﬁed life-cycle model
with intergenerational transfer of earnings ability and bequests captures the fundamen-
tal determinants of households saving and wealth accumulation.
I also investigate the quantitative relevance of earnings heterogeneity, borrowing
constraints, and intergenerational links, respectively, in causing heterogeneity in re-
tirement wealth. I ﬁnd that, while earnings heterogeneity and borrowing constraints
are essential to generate the heterogeneity in retirement wealth among low lifetime
earnings households, the existence of intergenerational links is crucial to explain the
heterogeneity in retirement wealth among high lifetime earnings households.
This paper abstracts from housing. Housing is the single largest investment made by
most consumers over their life time. The median household owns a house valued about
twice its annual earnings. As is shown in Yang (forthcoming), abstracting from housing
might bias the study of life-cycle consumption and assets accumulation behavior. It
will be interesting to extend this model to look at the eﬀect of earnings heterogeneity
and inheritance heterogeneity on wealth heterogeneity in an environment with housing.
7 Appendix
7.1 Deﬁnition of the stationary equilibrium
I focus on an equilibrium concept where factor prices and age-wealth distribution are
constant over time. Each agent’s state is denoted by x. An equilibrium is described as
follows.
Deﬁnition 1 A stationary equilibrium is given by government tax rates, transfers, and
spending (τl,τa,τb,exb,P(e y),G); an interest rate r and a wage rate w; deﬁned beneﬁt
31policies (τDB, DB(e y)); value functions V (x), allocations c(x), a0(x); and a constant
distribution of people m∗(x), such that the following conditions hold:
(i) Given government tax rates and transfers, the interest rate, the wage rate, and
deﬁned beneﬁt policies, the functions V (x), c(x) and a0(x) solve the described maxi-
mization problem for a household in a state x.
(ii) m∗ is the invariant distribution of households over the state variables for this
economy.21











C + (1 + n)K − (1 − δ)K + G = F(K;L)
(iv) The price of each factor is equal to its marginal product.




















7.2 Computation of the Model
I discretize both the productivity and the productivity inheritance processes to six-
state Markov chains according to Tauchen and Hussey (1991). Since I want the possible
realizations for the initial inherited productivity level to be the same as the possible
realizations for productivity during the lifetime, I choose the quadrature points jointly
for the two processes. The resulting grid points for the productivity process y are [
0.1464, 0.3356, 0.7002, 1.4283, 2.9801, 6.8306]. The transition matrix Qy is given by

 
   

0.6099 0.3537 0.0357 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000
0.1307 0.5327 0.3026 0.0333 0.0006 0.0000
0.0086 0.1974 0.5193 0.2528 0.02175 0.0001
0.0002 0.0218 0.2528 0.5193 0.1974 0.0086
0.0000 0.0006 0.0333 0.3026 0.5327 0.1307
0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0357 0.3537 0.6099

 
   

.
21I normalize m∗ so that m∗(X) = 1, which implies that m∗(χ) is the fraction of people alive that
are in a state χ.
32The transition matrix Qyh is given by

     

0.3668 0.4788 0.1426 0.0116 0.0002 0.0000
0.0922 0.4240 0.3855 0.0928 0.0054 0.0000
0.0134 0.1887 0.4615 0.2899 0.0454 0.0011
0.0011 0.0454 0.2899 0.4615 0.1887 0.0134
0.0000 0.0054 0.0928 0.3855 0.4240 0.0922
0.0000 0.0002 0.0116 0.1426 0.4788 0.3668

     

.
The transition matrices Qy and Qyh also induce an initial distribution of earnings.
The distribution of accumulated productivity at each age is approximated on a grid
of 36. The state space for asset holdings is discretized. Using this grid, I can store the
value functions and the distribution of households as ﬁnite-dimensional arrays.
I solve the approximated optimal consumption and saving plans recursively. House-
holds surviving to the last period T have an easy problem to solve. Based on the period
T policy functions, I solve the consumption and saving decisions that maximize the
period T − 1 value function. The same procedure is carried back until decision rules
in the ﬁrst period are computed for a large number of states.
For a given set of parameters, I solve for the steady state equilibrium as follows:
1. Given an initial guess of τl.
2. Given an initial guess of interest rate r, use the equilibrium conditions in the factor
markets to obtain the wage rate w.
3. Solve the value function for the last period of life for each of the points of the grid.
4. By backward induction, repeat step 3 until the ﬁrst period in life.
5. Guess an initial joint distribution of parents and children at the beginning of the life
cycle.
6. Given the initial distribution and policy functions, compute the associated stationary
distribution of households.
7. Compute the implied joint distribution of parents and children at the beginning of the
life cycle. If the distributions converge, go to step 8; otherwise go to step 5.
8. Given the stationary distribution and prices, compute factor input demands and
supplies and check whether market clearing conditions hold. If all markets clear, go to step
9. If not, go to step 2 and update interest rate r.
9, If the government budget is balanced, an equilibrium is found. If not, go to step 1 and
update τl.
7.3 Distribution of Lifetime Earnings
Table 8 compares values for the lifetime earnings distribution for the benchmark econ-
omy with those in the PSID (Hendricks (2007)). The model replicates the skewness
of lifetime earnings distribution. This is not one of the features matched by construc-
tion, and can be seen as evidence of the ability of the model to replicate the realistic
distribution of lifetime earnings.
33Top percentile (%)
Gini 1 1-5 5-10 10-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100
PSID 0.32 4.4 9.5 9.1 15.5 24.5 18.0 12.3 6.6
Benchmark 0.39 4.0 12.3 11.8 17.4 23.4 15.4 10.2 5.5
Table 8: Lorenz curve of lifetime earnings (benchmark model)
Mean lifetime earnings at each decile, in the data and in the model, normalized by
average lifetime earnings, is plotted in Figure 9. The model does a good job in matching
lifetime earnings for each decile reported in the PSID. Lifetime earnings in the HRS
are measured by the present value of Social Security earnings, and are more evenly
distributed than those in the PSID. The extreme low lifetime earnings for the lower
two deciles is caused by the fact that some persons in these deciles were employed
in sectors not covered by the Social Security system and thus reported zero Social
Security earnings. Lifetime earnings for the highest deciles in the HRS are subject to
top-coding and thus are lower than in the PSID.
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Figure 9: Mean of lifetime earnings for each earnings decile
7.4 Wealth Distribution
Table 9, row one, reports values for the wealth distribution for the benchmark economy.
The U.S. data on the wealth distribution is from Hendricks (2007) who uses 1994 wave
of PSID. In the PSID, wealth is highly unevenly distributed with a Gini coeﬃcient of
0.76. The top 1% of the households hold 23% of the total wealth. The model generates
a skewed wealth distribution that is comparable with the data except for the top 1%
of the wealth. The fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% is 12% in the model,
compared with 23% in the PSID.22
22An income process that implies very large earnings risk for the highest-income earners is key
in matching wealth dispersion (Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull (2003), and Cagetti and De
34Top percentile (%)
Gini 1 1-5 5-10 10-20 20-40 40-60
All PSID 0.76 22.8 22.5 14.4 16.8 16.3 6.4
Benchmark 0.74 12.1 26.3 18.5 19.8 16.8 5.47
Age 65 PSID 0.62 15.7 18.3 13.8 17.0 18.8 10.2
Benchmark 0.62 7.4 19.4 16.6 20.9 20.9 9.7
Table 9: Distribution of wealth (benchmark model)
Table 9, row two, compares values for the wealth distribution at retirement for
the benchmark economy with the U.S. data. Wealth at retirement is less unevenly
distributed than wealth for the whole economy both in the data and in the model. In
the benchmark the Gini coeﬃcient of wealth at retirement is 0.62, compared with 0.74
in the whole sample. The fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% is 7% in the model,
compared with 12% in the whole economy. This shows that a large amount of wealth
dispersion in the economy is due to diﬀerences in age. The model generates a skewed
retirement wealth distribution that is comparable with the data, expect for the top 1%
of the wealth holding.
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